Commenting on his Hezbollah chief’s statement that the cabinet is remaining , MP Hajjar said :

“(Sayyed Hassan) Nasrallah is proving once again that he is heading the cabinet “

Notwithstanding the never-ending stream of all those based-on-reliable-intelligence-sources analyses, it is doubtful whether these same analysts would be willing to bet whatever is left of their 401K retirement accounts on their predictions that Israel will — or will not — attack Iranian nuclear sites this year.

And while research institutions have conducted interesting exercises to try to figure out the military, diplomatic and economic repercussions of a confrontation between Israel and Iran, the dictum that no military plan survives the contact with the enemy applies also here — in addition to the unintended consequences, blowbacks and the proverbial ‘black swans’ that are bound to show up even in the unlikely scenario under which Israel achieves all or most of its military goals.

If I can put my ten cents worth of strategic thinking, it seems to me that the ousting of Saddam Hussein and the American fiasco in Iraq helped tip the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and the Levant in the direction of Iran and its allies. And that made it more likely that Israel and other Sunni Arab players that regard the Islamic Republic as a threat to their core national interests would use all their available resources to deprive Iran from having access to a military instrument that would allow it to formalize the new regional balance of power.

In his magisterial study of the 1812-1814 military campaigns in Europe, Russia Against Napoleon, historian Dominic Lieven suggests that while Tsar Alexander recognized that France would never be able to control Europe, he also concluded that the price of adhering to Napoleon’s Continental System would have undermined Russia’s position as a great power and that the Russians had no choice but to use the full power of their military to prevent that from happening.

My guess is that Israel, as well the Saudis and their Arab-Sunni allies, know that it would be possible to contain a nuclear Iran — in the same way that Russia could have embraced a cost-effective strategy to contain Napoleon’s France. But as long as Israeli leaders believe that they have a realistic option of blocking Iran’s nuclear program — and by extension, of setting major constraints on its ability to assert its position as a regional power — they will probably use their military capacity. The Saudis and their Gulf partners would probably cheer them behind close doors while publicly condemning them.

But as quite a few Israeli and American military experts have warned, a military strike on Iranian facilities would not achieve the declared Israeli goal of ending Iran’s alleged nuclear military program and the expected costs in terms of Israeli casualties could be very high.
Moreover, if Iran gives the green light to its Shiite Hezbollah allies in Lebanon to attack Israel and mobilize the Shiites in Iraq and the Persian Gulf to retaliate against American and Saudi targets, Tehran would be in a position to strengthen its regional power. The ayatollahs would also be able to exploit an Israeli attack to ignite Iranian nationalism and win support even from those Iranians who actually oppose the ruling clerics and would like to see them removed from power.

And while the Obama administration insists that it wants to apply peaceful means to get Iran to freeze its nuclear enrichment program, it is not clear that Washington and its Europeans allies would succeed in coming up with a diplomatic formula that would be acceptable to Iran and to Israel (and its supporters in Washington) or that the Americans would be able to prevent Israel from taking military action against Iran. Those of us who believe that an Israeli military attack would not serve American and Israeli interests and may actually help consolidate the power of Iran in the Middle East and that of the clerics in Teheran should also recognize that President Barack Obama — who probably agrees with these assumptions — is not in a position for a diplomatic confrontation with Israel during a presidential election year.

In fact, even in a non-election year, there will be very little incentive for Mr Obama to launch a creative diplomatic opening to Iran at a time when the Iranian leadership does not have the power to make a deal with Washington and is facing strong opposition at home from liberal and conservative forces alike (who, despite their differences, want Iran to acquire nuclear military capacity).

And at a time when the Middle East is going through the political turmoil of the Arab Spring and the US is engaged in a steady drawdown from its military occupation of Iraq, the shaky balance of power in the region would make it difficult for Washington to try to reach a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran. Such a move, coming in the aftermath of the collapse of the pro-American regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, would be perceived by the Saudis and other Arab-Sunni governments as another sign of US weakness.

If Israel decides to attack Iran, expect the Obama administration to provide it with logistical and other support, including by vetoing a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel (unlike the Reagan administration which did join the Security Council’s censure of the Israeli attack on the Iraq nuclear reactor in Osirak in 1981).

Leaf from History

Yet, in the same way that the outcome of the 1973 Middle East War provided the then Nixon administration with an opportunity to protect and even strengthen its position in the Middle East, by renewing diplomatic relations with Egypt and working to bring peace between the Egyptians and the Israelis, the Obama administration could find itself in a position to advance its interests in the aftermath of an Israel-Iran military confrontation and an ensuing Middle Eastern war. A potential leading player in such a post-war scenario would be Turkey which until now has played a clever diplomatic game vis-a-vis Iran. In the most significant act of military cooperation between Washington and Ankara since 2003, Turkey agreed last year to station sophisticated American radars, part of a US-led system to defend Europe against a potential Iranian missile attack, and has expressed strong opposition against any move by Iran to acquire nuclear military weapons.

At the same time, the Turks have also been in the forefront of the diplomatic opposition against a military strike against Iran and, working with Brazil, it proposed a diplomatic deal to freeze Iranian uranium enrichment in exchange for ending the US-led sanctions against Iran.
And while Turkey is a member of NATO and remains a close military ally of Washington, its recent diplomatic assertiveness and its tensions with Israel coupled with its strong support for democratic activists in the Arab World, has strengthened its status in the Middle East and could allow it to play the role of grand mediator between the US and Iran in a post-war scenario.

Indeed, working with Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the Arab League, as well with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union, the Obama administration could propose the convening of a Middle East Conference chaired by Turkey that would bring together all the Arab states, Iran and Israel and that would set the stage for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region (which would apply also to Iran as well as to Israel’s nuclear arsenal) and to a series of diplomatic initiatives to help stabilize Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and revitalize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process along the lines of the old Arab League proposal.

In that context, the US and Iran could also start repairing their diplomatic ties and Teheran would be encouraged to support any resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is agreed on both sides. Not for the first time in history, the end of a war could help create the conditions for stability, cooperation and peace. It could be worth the try.

The terminal, which is scheduled to pump 87.25 billion cubic feet of imported gas into Israel’s energy network annually, is intended as a stopgap until the Jewish state’s new fields go on-stream in 2013 at the earliest.

The new fields, Leviathan and the smaller Tamar field, hold an estimated 25 trillion cubic feet of gas. Major new strikes are expected as Noble Energy Co., which has its headquarters in Texas, and its Israelis partners, extend exploration.

The U.S. Geological Survey reported that the Levant Basin, which covers Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus and the Gaza Strip, contains around 122 tcf of gas and at least 1.7 billion barrels of oil.

Israel’s big finds, which are likely to extend into Cypriot and Lebanese waters, significantly alter the strategic energy picture in the eastern Mediterranean.

Given the region’s history of war — the Arab-Israeli conflict and the historical Greece-Turkey rivalry which resulted in the 1974 division of Cyprus — there are fears this abundance of energy wealth could trigger new battles.

Lebanon, with which Israel is technically at war — they clashed in a 34-day war in the summer of 2006 — claims Israel’s Leviathan field extends into Lebanese waters.

Israel’s plans to defend its gas fields reflects its concerns that they are highly vulnerable to attack by terrorists using anti-ship missiles, frogmen or suicide bombers in boats packed with explosives.

In this regard, the main worry is the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Israel’s military says possess 42,000 missiles and rockets, including Chinese-designed C-802 anti-ship missiles that seriously damaged an Israeli corvette in the 2006 fighting.

Syria recently took delivery of 72 supersonic Russian-built P-800 Yakhont anti-ship missiles with a range of 190 miles and powerful enough to sink a large ship. Israeli leaders say they fears these could possibly be passed on to Hezbollah for use against the Israeli gas production platforms.

On top of that, in 2011 the Israeli navy seized an Iranian arms shipment, including six Nasr-1 radar-guided anti-ship missiles it claimed was bound for the Palestinian Hamas organization in Gaza.

Military commanders say the production platforms and associated installations will be prime targets if a new Middle East war erupts between Iran and the West currently confronting each other in the Persian Gulf.

Concerns have been heightened by a recent foray into the eastern Mediterranean by the Iranian navy. Two vessels transited the Suez Canal to visit the Syrian port of Tartus in Iran’s first naval mission into those waters since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Tehran has said it plans to deploy warships in the Mediterranean on a more regular basis. Most of the Israeli navy is deployed in those waters.

The strategic importance of the gas fields, which are expected to transform Israel’s economy and earn it billions of dollars in energy exports, is underlined by the plan to strengthen the navy at a time when the hard-pressed government is slashing the defense budget.

No details of the cost of the naval program have been disclosed. But The Jerusalem Post said some of it will be underwritten by state-owned companies tasked with constructing and operating the sea-based LNG facility several miles off the northern city of Hadera.

Up to now, Israel has been importing gas from neighboring Egypt, with which it signed a landmark peace treaty in 1979, supplementing gas from Israel’s only working gas field that’s nearly depleted.

The Egyptian gas supplies are problematical. The gas pipeline across the Sinai Peninsula has been attacked 12 times since the uprising in Egypt that erupted in January 2011. The latest bombing Sunday ruptured the line again.

Israel imported 43 percent of its gas from Egypt and that’s now been largely cut off. But that’s just half the problem.

The interim government in Cairo, installed after President Hosni Mubarak was driven from office Feb. 11, 2011, claims the fees for the gas were far too low. It wants hefty increases.

Israel’s reluctant to agree to that even though the Tamar field isn’t expected to begin production until 2013 at the earliest.
upi

National News Agency ( NNA) identified the injured Syrian as Ahmad Mustafa Khoder and reported that he was transferred to Our Lady of Peace Hospital in the Lebanese town of Qoubayat.

The NNA report added that “due to his critical condition, the injured Syrian will be [later] transferred to Tripoli’s public hospital” .

Syrian troops on Tuesday planted more mines along the border with northern Lebanon, in an area close to the flashpoint central province of Homs, a Lebanese official said.

“Syrian army units for three days have been planting mines along the border area between the Syrian village of Bweet and the Lebanese village of Hnayder,” the official from Hnayder said, requesting anonymity.

He said bulldozers were also reinforcing dirt mounds that separate the two borders.

Hnayder is located in Lebanon’s Wadi Khaled region where some 6,400 Syrians have sought refuge since the outbreak of the 11-month revolt against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Syria in past months has planted mines near the area to prevent refugees streaming in or for Lebanon to become a safe haven for the Syrian opposition.

The remaining advocates of Bashar Assad are working overtime to portray a vision of a completely chaotic Middle East if and when the Alawite regime finally collapses. To predict chaos in the Middle East is a safe bet, so what’s really new in this case? The threat of chaos is almost automatically linked to another round of Arab-Israeli war, this time a Shi’ite-led Iranian-Hezbollah-Alawite desperate attack on Israel. Well, while the Israelis may naturally take the proper precautionary steps to deal with the day after Assad, they are far from showing any sign of undue worry or panic.

There is concern about the arsenal of chemical warheads that is in Syrian hands, some of it was transferred to Syria from Iraq on the eve of the American invasion of March 2003. The fear is that these warheads may find their way to Hezbollah and Iran. Surely not a pleasant prospect, but not one that cannot be dealt with. Even Hezbollah and the Iranians know that any attempt to use these weapons against Israel will be calamitous to them. The thought that either of the two will risk their very existence [in the case of Hezbollah], or most vital national interests [in the case of Iran], in support of the Alawite dictatorship is good for psychological warfare, but not in the real world. The same applies to the possibility of Iranian closure of the straits of Hormuz in support of Assad. Really? Not really…

They will not do that. All this is relevant to the Syrian situation and its implications, not to the much talked-about scenario of an Israeli or American attack against the Iranian nuclear program. This is clearly a totally different opera. The connection between a final collapse of the Assad regime and the Israeli and/or American calculus regarding Iran is possible but not inevitable. Sure, a Syrian participation in an Iranian retaliation against a strike is not something cherished by Israeli and American planners and policy makers, but this is becoming a remote possibility since the Syrian Army is in a stage of disintegration. General Mustafa Al-Sheikh, the highest ranking Syrian defector, predicted some days ago that the Syrian Army will disintegrate until the end of February. This may be wishful thinking in terms of the timing, but not the process, which is very obvious, leading in the not distant future to that exact outcome. So, if we move away from the Israeli angle of the situation, what else can happen affecting neighboring countries and overall regional stability? First, we can expect a massive refugee problem, Alawites trying to cross to Lebanon and Turkey. Also, possible mass flight out of Ba’athi functionaries, not just Alawites. Chaos in Syria will inevitably take its toll of neighboring Lebanon.

Tripoli, a Sunni city with a sizable Alawite minority, is likely to explode, and that will be part of a bigger issue in Lebanon, as the traditional anti-Assad forces there, mainly the Sunnis and some Christian Maronite factions, will find the new circumstances conducive to put pressure on Hezbollah, demanding it dismantle its arms. The not so old wounds created by the assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri will reopen with ferocity. Whether all that will lead Lebanon towards chaos is not clear, though it’s likely. Sheikh Nasrallah, however, will find himself and Hezbollah engaged in a conflict with the majority of the Lebanese people. So, under these circumstances, a war initiated by him against Israel may seem a good diversionary exercise, but still is highly unlikely. The Sheikh will fight for his own survival inside Lebanon as his first priority.

Another country that will feel the brunt of the Assad collapse will be Iraq, where the current Sunni-Shi’i tension may be greatly exacerbated, as the former will be much encouraged by the rise of a new regime in Syria, most likely Sunni-dominated. Not for nothing, the Maliki government in Iraq is the most pro-Assad Arab government. They know why.

Then there is Turkey. But for the expected Alawite flight across the northwestern border, the Turks should be greatly preoccupied by the fallout of a collapse in Damascus on the northeast border, where over 2 million Syrian Kurds live, just waiting to rid themselves of the Assad yoke. An unruly Kurdish population on the Syrian side of the border will not be good news to the Turkish government and military having to deal with their own unruly Kurdish population.

The Turks may gain, however, many political dividends from their support to the Sunni Syrian rebels. A Sunni-dominated regime in Damascus is likely to be friendly to Ankara, and so Turkey’s overall regional standing may be significantly enhanced. Such a regime in Damascus will also be friendly to the Saudis, and a Turkish-Saudi rivalry over influence in Damascus of the future is highly likely. The big losers will be Iranians. They cannot expect a friendly Syrian government in the near future. The overall regional Sunni-Shi’i schism will be in display in the most dramatic way. But even that is not really new, as this schism has been a feature of Middle East Islamic reality since the killing of Imam Hussein in 680 A.D.

The downfall of Bashar Assad is behind the door. No Armageddon, but still a significant challenge to regional stability.

*Adjunct Professor, University of South Carolina
Huffington Post

Al-Jazeera TV channels in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Kesrouan and the north were replaced by a note broadcasted by a group of cable providers.

“We apologize to our viewers for ending the broadcast of Al-Jazeera channels … the decision was made as a result of warnings issued by Al-Jazeera to cable providers in Lebanon to impose additional chargers on viewers,” said the note.

“Al-Jazeera has called for a charge of $1.50 from every cable subscriber in the country [who receives their channels] in addition to the monthly charge for their cable … Customers cannot pay such an amount of money to watch Al-Jazeera,” said one cable provider in Ashrafieh.

Suleiman Farah, a board member of UCL, said the company is willing to pay fees to Al-Jazeera, but he argued that the fees should be consistent with the financial capacity of the Lebanese.

According to Farah, broadcast rights are being exploited by businessmen who have been making deals with the foreign satellite companies to exploit the Lebanese market.

Farah said the Lebanese government should have a role in the pricing of foreign licenses in the country. “I don’t think it is reasonable that Iraq pays $1 million, while Lebanon pays $5 million for the OSN,” he added.

DS

Al Arabiya also reported that according to media reports “the Quds Force , which is the foreign division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard sent 15 thousand fighters to Syria, but Tehran has denied the reports.

The Syrian opposition has reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah are helping the forces loyal to Assad in the crackdown

Hezbollah in Lebanon was formed by the Quds Forces in 1982

Turkey is seen as one of the main threats.

The move follows the announcement Sunday by the Noble Energy Co., of Houston and its Israeli partner the Delek Group, that they had made a new discovery off the Israeli coast that could contain 1.2 trillion-1.3 trillion cubic feet of gas.

Israel is already preparing to launch a major security operation to protect the offshore fields and the attendant facilities in its waters.

This will involve missile-armed patrol vessels, round-the-clock aerial surveillance by unmanned drones and other naval detachments, primarily to defend the energy zones against attack by Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed force in neighboring Lebanon.

Israel’s main gas zones, discovered by Noble in 2009-10, are the Leviathan field holding an estimated 16 tcf and the nearby Tamar field with 8 tcf. These are part of the Levant Basin which the U.S. Geological Survey reported in 2010 contains an estimated 122 tcf of natural gas and around 1.7 billion barrels of oil.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is expected to ask the Cypriot government, which controls the southern two-thirds of the war-divided Mediterranean island, to allow Israeli air force combat jets to use the Andreas Papandreou air base outside the southwestern resort city of Paphos.

“It is unclear if the request will be to station a permanent presence on the island or to establish a base that could provide logistical support for the (air force) during operations in the region,” The Jerusalem Post’s military analyst Yaakov Katz reported.

Cyprus’ Famagusta Gazette newspaper said Tuesday that discussions about providing facilities for the Israeli air force are at “an exploratory stage.”

But Katz surmised that Israel’s objective is “to be able to more effectively protect the growing number of gas fields it is discovering in the Mediterranean.”

The prospect of the air force getting access to the Paphos base was heightened in December when Cypriot Defense Minister Demetris Eliades signed two military cooperation agreements with his Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak, during a visit to Tel Aviv.

The Greek Cypriot government in Nicosia has no air force and only a miniscule naval force that’s heavily outgunned by the military might of Turkey, its longtime adversary to the north.

Eliades has made it clear the Israelis have approval “in advance” to operate in Cypriot air space and waters. Actually basing Israeli aircraft in southern Cyprus is guaranteed to rile the Turks.

Cyprus has launched its own gas exploration program in waters off its southern coast that abut the northern extremity of Israel’s Leviathan field.

Initial results, with Noble Energy handling the drilling, indicate the Greek Cypriots are sitting on an energy bonanza of their own.

Cyprus has been divided since Turkey invaded in 1974 after a short-lived coup by supporters of union with Greece. The Turks seized the northern third of the island and proclaimed it the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is recognized only by Ankara.

Israel and Cyprus plan to pool resources and jointly export their gas through an underwater pipeline to the European Union via Greece.

Turkey says the Cypriots have no right to do that unilaterally, threatening a possible flare-up of the historic rivalry between the Turks and Greeks.

Ankara has dispatched warships and at least one seismic survey ship into the disputed zone and in 2011 stationed a squadron of F-16 fighter jets at a TRNC airbase.

Turkey is also at odds with Israel, its onetime strategic ally. It reversed the alliance in 2010 after the Israeli Navy killed nine Turks when intercepting a Turkish-run flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to the Israeli-blockaded Gaza Strip.

In recent weeks, Barak has pledged to upgrade Israel’s defense links with Greece as well.

Debt-ridden Greece, which is staring economic collapse in the face, is only too happy to hook up with a war-seasoned military power like the Israel to confound the Turks.

The Israeli air force has had joint exercises with the Greek air force in recent months.

Israel also faces threats from neighboring Lebanon, which also seeks to benefit from the energy boom. Beirut claims Israel is poaching on its territorial zone, which has yet to be demarcated by treaty.
UPI

The government reaffirmed a previous “decision to raise the share capital of the company and approved the participation of the government as main shareholder in the new capital issue,” government spokesman Stefanos Stefanou told reporters in Nicosia today. “The government also decided to authorize the finance minister to negotiate the sale of Cyprus Airways shares and shape a relevant proposal that will be submitted to cabinet for approval.”

The government’s decision to participate in the company’s capital increase must be approved by the east Mediterranean island’s Commissioner for State Aid, Stefanou said, declining to comment on the company’s value.

Last year, the airline, which posted 29.3 million euros ($38.4 million) in losses in the first half of 2011, received 20 million euros in compensation package from the Cypriot government for extra costs incurred as a result of Turkey’s ban on Cypriot traffic and underwent a restructuring plan in an attempt to save 40 million euros annually.

Talks to sell the loss-making airline to Russia’s Aeroflot have already begun and are at an “advanced stage,” while Lebanon’s Middle East Air Airlines has also shown interest in buying a stake in the carrier, Kathimerini newspaper reported on its website today, without saying where it got the information.

Cyprus Airways has seen its stock recover this month on reports that the government was mulling the sale of a majority stake to a strategic investor. Share rose for a sixth day, climbing 6.7 percent to 0.08 euros today after falling to a six- month low of 0.046 euros on Jan. 31.

BW/ Bloomberg

Forged in neighboring Turkey over the summer by military defectors, the FSA has become a major factor in the opposition to the regime.

The grass-roots armed resistance is growing, attracting civilians as well as military defectors, and has become a thorn in the side of the Syrian military and the pro-regime militias, observers say. But it needs more personnel, better resources and improved coordination to take on the Syrian security presence, they add.

“The FSA is contributing to the strain on regime forces by requiring them to operate almost continuously and engage in frequent combat,” said Jeffrey White, a defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

“This is in addition to the strain created by hundreds of peaceful civilian demonstrations across the country each week. The regime has been compelled to deploy larger forces and conduct more violent operations, increasing both its losses and the international visibility of its actions,” he said.

“Although attrition of regime personnel is not yet numerically significant, the spectacle of burned-out government vehicles and dead soldiers likely rallies the opposition and decreases morale among regime loyalists.”

White made remarks in a January 27 essay titled “The Free Syrian Army Bleeds the Assad Regime,” and elaborated on that analysis in an interview Wednesday.

He said government operations “in recent days have pushed the FSA to a lower level of activity.” But he also said the regime “has not been able to eradicate the FSA in any area.”

He said the FSA has been engaged in combat in at least six of the country’s 14 provinces — Idlib, Hama, Homs, Deir Ezzor, Daraa, and Rif Dimashq. Rif Dimashq includes the Damascus suburbs.

The fighters have been “inflicting greater losses on regime personnel and equipment than at any time since its involvement in the uprising began,” White said.

He said about 180 clashes were reported between early November and late January. One-third occurred in Idlib province and about a quarter in Daraa, while clashes have increased in Rif Dimashq.

The group has operated openly in places like Idlib province and the cities of Homs, Hama and Zabadani, and it has established control over some small pockets.

“Their most common operations include attacking regime positions (primarily checkpoints), defending demonstrators and local areas, and ambushing regime forces,” White said.

Rebels say they are not getting weapons and money from outside groups. White said most of the weapons are captured or bought from the Syrian military. Some smuggling is reported, he added.

The rebels are getting better armed, with more and better antitank weapons, and the number of defections is growing, White said.

Members of the Free Syrian Army train outside Idlib, Syria.

“Several videos suggest it has guided antitank missiles as well,” White said.

“It seems to have no shortage of small arms and light crew-served weapons, including assault rifles, medium machine guns, standard rocket-propelled grenades, and scoped/sniper rifles. The FSA also claims to be employing improvised explosive devices against regime vehicles, and videos have corroborated this. In addition, it has begun using vehicles for tactical troop movement, equipped with improvised armor and machine guns.”

There have been a number of cases of soldiers defecting with armored vehicles, he said.

The FSA claimed to have as many as 40,000 personnel. White said 4,000 to 7,000 is a “more reasonable estimate” but there has been a “substantial increase” from November. He said the size of group defections is growing, from the five to 20 people to platoon-sized defections of 30 or so people.

There are 38 named battalions in the FSA, some more closely associated with the central command than others, White said.

While there is guidance from FSA headquarters, there appears to be no day-to-day control. White said FSA battalions appear to be fighting alone and haven’t yet shown “they can coordinate operations on a regional basis.”

“Essentially these battalions are largely independent operations. There’s no substructure underneath the FSA command in Turkey that operates the battalions,” he said.

“It is unclear to what extent the FSA’s command in Turkey exercises real control over operations, other than providing general guidance. It is also uncertain how much freedom of action Turkey allows these commanders. This means that FSA units are essentially conducting independent actions while the regime conducts coordinated operations.”

Civilians have been joining FSA units because of the “synergy” between the resistance group and the populace, he said. Some civilians are locals who simply link up with battalions and there may be local defense groups forming under the Free Syrian Army banner.

“Some of these groups may have civilians who joined them. My sense is that the core, the primary combat forces, are coming from defectors,” he said.

The group is also working to develop closer relations with the Syrian National Council, the political opposition.

While coordinating operations is one challenge for the FSA, others are cohesion and military limitations. News of a power struggle has emerged in recent days between FSA head Col. Riad al Assad and a general, Mustapha Sheikh, forming a rival Higher Military Council. Another group, the Al Faroukh Battalion, said it is operating outside the control of both groups.

FSA Lt. Col. Mohamed Hamado told CNN that “many of the officers fighting on the ground have pledged allegiance” to Sheikh. “They operate from the Turkish/Syrian borders at the refugee camps, while we are fighting on the ground and are very organized,” he said.

White said any rift wouldn’t help them but it’s not having an effect on combat. It would have a greater effect if a world player decided it wanted to funnel money to the fighters.

U.S. lawmakers such as Sen. John McCain said Washington should consider arming such rebels.

White said it wouldn’t surprise him if international clandestine services are feeling out the FSA to see “what they are made of,” but there’s no solid evidence of any outside help.

Hamado said that despite the FSA’s efforts “it cannot defeat Assad’s army with the weapons he is using. He has escalated his attacks by using helicopters, rocket launchers and mortars.”

The Syrian regime is dominated by the Alawite minority. The Syrian opposition has a large Sunni component.

Hamado said there are concerns that among world powers that arms would fall into the hands of Islamists.

“The international community is reluctant to donate weapons because the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is highly represented” in the Syrian National Council.

While Syrian militants wait for outside help, Hamado said the regime has backing from outside entities — Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah in Syria.

“We have captured Iranian fighters from the Revolutionary Guard and broadcast the videos showing the weapons they used to refute claims that they were technicians. Many civilians and eyewitnesses gave testimonials about Iranians storming into their homes during the searches and arrests along with Assad’s army recruits.”

Based in Latakia, on the coast, Hamado said, he has seen signs of the Hezbollah modus operandi.

“What we know for sure is that the regime is digging trenches around Latakia coast just the same way they are dug in southern Lebanon, which is controlled by Hezbollah. Assad’s Army has installed rocket launchers in the mountains of Latakia and are in a process of setting up a self-sustained region similar to the Hezbollah establishment in Lebanon, in order to have a base after Assad falls,” Hamado said.

Aram Nerguizian, visiting fellow with Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that despite some operational and tactical victories in the provinces of Idlib, Hama and Homs and in some Damascus suburbs, the Syrian military “continues to control many key checkpoints leading to rebel-held neighborhoods and districts.”

The FSA needs “better organization, leadership, command and control and more military personnel and hardware” to compete with the government’s “security apparatus” and resilient military. Nerguizian said its manpower is in the low thousands and “there are few indications that the force has been able to establish a clear chain of command.”

He added that “elements of the armed opposition seem to be operating outside the umbrella of the FSA and cities like Homs and Hama have seen the emergence of home-grown armed groups or militias intent on defending their neighborhoods against the crackdown.”

While there have been defections, he said, “there seems to have been far more outright desertions than shifts of forces to the FSA.”

As for Syrian military leaders, they back the regime because of fear of reprisals if al-Assad’s rule ends and their “deep aversion to prolonged instability.” But the prospect of a split in the military could be a good sign for the resistance forces.

“While the Syrian military needed time to absorb the shock of mounting internal opposition, it now appears to be on the offensive and it is likely to remain critical to the survival of the Assad regime. Should it experience real divisions in the future, the FSA may be able to take advantage,” Nerguizian said.

CNN